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Contrary to the central thesis of this Symposium on “Our Expanding 
First Amendment,” this Article posits that the scope of certain First 
Amendment protections actually has contracted, rather than expanded, 
over time. More specifically, the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have 
issued decisions that significantly restrict access to public property for 
speech activity. Under the rubric of the public forum doctrine, less 
public property is available today for speech activity than was the case 
under the precedents of the Warren and Burger Courts. Moreover, even 
with respect to government property that constitutes a traditional or 
designated public forum, the federal courts have permitted government 
to burden, or even banish, speech activity through the adoption and 
enforcement of time, place, and manner (TPM) regulations. By way of 
contrast, during the Warren and Burger Court eras, the federal courts 
generally presumed that government property must be available for 
speech activity; the burden fell squarely on the government to justify 
denying access to public property for First Amendment activities. 
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This Article posits that the contemporary public forum doctrine, in 
conjunction with the TPM doctrine, vests too much discretionary power 
with government to squelch speech activity on public property. Instead 
of using a rigid, categorical approach to decide whether government 
must make public property available for speech activity, the federal 
courts should instead use a functional approach to decide what 
constitutes a public forum—essentially the approach used by the 
Warren and Burger Courts. Simply put, public spaces compatible with 
First Amendment activity should be available for such activity. Second, 
federal courts should be less ready to sustain TPM regulations—
particularly when the context of their adoption suggests a censorial 
motive. It is probably unrealistic to propose a complete return to the 
open balancing test that prevailed under the Warren and Burger 
Courts. Even if this is so, however, the public forum and TPM doctrines 
could be reformed to create, literally, more breathing space for First 
Amendment activities essential to sustaining the project of democratic 
self-government. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: OUR SHRINKING FIRST AMENDMENT AND REDUCED 
ACCESS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR SPEECH ACTIVITY 
Over time, the federal courts have become predictably and consistently less 
willing to force government—at all levels—to make public property available 
for First Amendment activities.1 For would-be speakers who do not own 
property suitable for holding a mass protest or rally—or even for a peaceful 
picket or leafletting exercise—access to government-owned property is simply 
essential to their ability to speak. To the extent that the government may ban 
expressive activity from its property, would-be speakers will face the unenviable 
task of finding a private property owner who is willing to make land available 
to them for their protest.2 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (holding that sidewalks 
within a U.S. Post Office parking lot, adjacent to the main post office building, that were 
generally open to postal service customers were not a public forum and could be closed to 
speech activity); Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1158–61 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016) (holding that the open public plaza in front of the U.S. Supreme Court 
building “to be a nonpublic forum” and observing that the plaza’s status as a nonpublic forum 
“is unaffected by the public’s unrestricted access to the plaza at virtually any time”); 
Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the Jefferson 
Memorial, in Washington, D.C., is not a public forum for First Amendment activities); 
Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 615 F.3d 508, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
national parks are not presumptive public forums and that “to establish that a national park 
(in whole or part) is a traditional public forum, Boardley must show that, like a typical 
municipal park, it has been held open by the government for the purpose of public 
discourse”); United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 219, 222 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that the 
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, commonly known as the “St. Louis Arch,” 
constitutes a public forum, but nevertheless sustaining the National Park Service’s creation 
of five designated “free speech zones” within the park and limiting First Amendment activity 
to these areas). Two principal problems exist. First, federal courts are broadly deferential to 
government decisions to label a park or memorial a “non-public forum,” which empowers 
the government to essentially ban expressive activities from the venue. Hodge, 799 F.3d at 
1157–58. Second, federal courts accept draconian regulations on speech activities within 
traditional public forums that exist to advance interests in “tranquility” and “the safety and 
attractiveness” of the government’s property. Kistner, 68 F.3d at 222. Both the designation 
of parks and monuments as nonpublic forums, and the aggressive use of time, place, and 
manner regulations, significantly reduce the space available for speech activity. See infra 
notes 14–16, 117–31 and accompanying text. 
 2 For example, Cindy Sheehan wished to protest President George W. Bush’s Iraq War 
policies in a direct and personal way—and was able to accomplish this objective when a 
private property owner with land adjacent to the route used by President Bush’s motorcade 
going to and from his ranch in Crawford, Texas permitted her to use it for protest activity. 
See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush and the Protestor: Tale of 2 Summer Camps, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
22, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/22/politics/bush-and-the-protester-tale-of-2-
summer-camps.html [https://perma.cc/CRE5-9QXK]. Sheehan had initially used the 
shoulder of a county road for her protest, but the local government enacted a ban on such 
activity on public property. See Associated Press, Mother’s Antiwar Protest Prompts New 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/us/national-
briefing-south-texas-mothers-antiwar-protest-prompts-new-law.html 
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For a variety of reasons, however, private property owners are not apt to 
respond with alacrity to requests to use their property for various forms of social, 
economic, or political protest activity.3 It should not be surprising that private 
companies operating shopping malls, hotels, theaters, amusement parks, and the 
like generally would prefer to avoid the potential controversy of being 
associated with highly unpopular causes and speakers.4 
Of course, if one owns property suitable for speech activity, or has the 
ability to rent property to engage in speech activity, lack of access to 
government-owned property does not matter. So too, if the speech activity in 
question is highly popular and uncontroversial, both government and private 
property owners are likely to be willing to host it voluntarily.5 For example, the 
organizers of a mass participation event to raise funds for breast cancer research 
are likely to have an easier time finding public or private space for a rally than 
the Ku Klux Klan or Nazi Party. Accordingly, the burden of declining access to 
public property for speech activity falls much more heavily on some speakers 
                                                                                                                     
[https://perma.cc/LJK2-PKKS] [hereinafter Mother’s Antiwar Protest]. The county 
government also prohibited parking on twenty-three miles of county roads to make staging 
protests near the President’s ranch more difficult. See id. In response, Sheehan purchased a 
five acre parcel of land, using proceeds from her deceased son’s military death benefits to 
do so. See Associated Press, War Critic Buys Land in Same Town as President Bush’s Ranch, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/28/us/28brfs-004.html 
[https://perma.cc/J884-VRQP]. The land was proximate to President Bush’s ranch in 
Crawford, Texas, and her ownership of it enabled Sheehan to maintain her “Camp Casey” 
anti-war protest in honor of her deceased son, Casey Sheehan, who was killed while serving 
on active duty in Iraq. See id.; see also Associated Press, War Protestor Will Sell Land by 
Bush Ranch, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/10/us/ 
10sheehan.html?fta=y&pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/X4X8-J7EJ]. Thus, Cindy 
Sheehan literally had to acquire property in order to speak her version of truth to power. 
Moreover, she did so only after the local government used its ownership rights over public 
property—rights of way along county roads—to banish dissent. Mother’s Antiwar Protest, 
supra.  
 3 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518–21 (1976) (holding that private mall 
owners need not permit expressive activities on mall property); Lloyd Corp. v Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551, 563–64, 569–70 (1972) (sustaining a mall owner’s decision to prohibit leafletting 
and picketing at a large shopping mall in Portland, Oregon). But cf. PruneYard Shopping 
Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 86–87 (1980) (upholding, against a First Amendment 
challenge, the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state constitution to create a 
right of access to privately-owned shopping centers for peaceful fixed leafletting activities); 
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504–09 (1946) (holding that a private corporation that 
undertakes all of the duties and responsibilities of a municipal government constitutes a state 
actor and, therefore, must permit and facilitate First Amendment activities within the 
company-owned town). 
 4 See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87 (rejecting a mall owner’s complaint that private 
speech occurring in a large shopping mall inevitably would be attributed to the mall owner 
because (1) the protesters’ messages “will not likely be identified with those of the owner” 
and (2) the mall’s owner easily could “expressly disavow any connection with the message 
by simply posting signs in the area where the speakers or handbillers stand”). 
 5 See infra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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than on others—and will correlate strongly with the popularity or unpopularity 
of both speakers and messages.6 
But it was not always thus.7 To be sure, the broadly protective decisions of 
the Warren Court might well have had as much to do with the identity of the 
speakers seeking access to public property for speech activity as with the generic 
requirements of the First Amendment.8 Although the Supreme Court 
consistently has embraced viewpoint- and content-neutrality as central aspects 
of the nation’s commitment to safeguarding the freedom of speech,9 it would 
require almost willful blindness to ignore the fact that the most broadly 
protective free speech decisions of the 1960s invariably involved civil rights 
protests in the Deep South.10 Nevertheless, as the antiwar protests of the 
Vietnam era exploded in the late 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court did not 
resile from its general approach—an approach that started with the presumption 
that public spaces suitable for expressive activity should be available for such 
activity.11 
Going back to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization, decided in 1939, the federal courts have 
required government entities to make public property available for speech 
activity.12 As late as the 1960s, the federal courts generally held that government 
property should be presumptively available for speech activity.13 Under the 
contemporary public forum doctrine, however, the ability of the government to 
restrict access to public property for speech activity has increased 
                                                                                                                     
 6 See HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140–41, 145 
(1965) (discussing the problem of the “heckler veto” and the need for federal courts to be 
vigilant in thwarting efforts to empower a heckler’s veto over speech by unpopular speakers 
on public property); see also Owen M. Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 
IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1413–17 (1986) (citing Kalven’s seminal work on the problem of a 
heckler’s veto, discussing the problem of the heckler’s veto, observing that private market 
power can be used to silence unpopular speakers, and positing that government efforts to 
limit the censorial power of non-government actors could enhance rather than inhibit the 
vibrancy of the marketplace of ideas). 
 7 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 138–43 (1966) (holding that the government 
must regulate speech activity “in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory manner, equally 
applicable to all and administered with equality to all” and requiring a local government to 
make the public library available for a silent civil rights protest). 
 8 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana (Cox I), 379 U.S. 536, 538–39 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana 
(Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 566–67 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 229–30, 
237 (1963). 
 9 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–41 (2010); United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813–14 (2000); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–
96 (1972). As Justice Thurgood Marshall explained in Mosley, “[A]bove all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its 
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
 10 See supra note 8. 
 11 See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
 12 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511–12, 524–25 (1939). 
 13 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 (1969). 
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significantly;14 simply put, the strong presumption of access to government 
property for speech activity no longer exists.15 Thus, during the Warren and 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 439, 440, 447 (2006) [hereinafter Zick, Expressive Topography]; Timothy 
Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 581–83, 585–86 (2006); see also 
Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 548–54 
(2009) (describing and critiquing various government efforts to suppress if not eliminate 
public dissent on government-owned property). Professor Tabatha Abu El-Haj has 
documented how governments (at all levels) increasingly marginalize speech in public places 
through burdensome regulations and argues that “[a]ll of these requirements undercut the 
possibility of large, spontaneous gatherings in the streets.” Id. at 549. 
 15 See, e.g., Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a 
First Amendment challenge to a federal statute that bans protest on the large, elevated marble 
plaza located in front of the United States Supreme Court because of “the government’s long-
recognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the 
appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure”). 
However, the statute regulated considerably more speech than was necessary to secure this 
interest. See 40 U.S.C. § 6135 (2012). Section 6135 bars protest on the plaza regardless of 
whether the Supreme Court is actually in session. See Pete Williams, Supreme Court Rebuffs 
Challenge to Protest Limits, NBC NEWS (May 16, 2016), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/supreme-court-rebuffs-challenge-protest-limits-
n574651 [https://perma.cc/4FGN-ANGY]. It is difficult to see how a protest on the plaza in 
mid-August, when the Justices are usually not even on the premises, could possibly 
influence, or give the appearance of undue influence, on the Justices. The statute bans 
virtually all expressive activity on the plaza, making it illegal to “parade, stand, or move in 
processions or assemblages in the Supreme Court Building or grounds, or to display in the 
Building and grounds a flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice 
a party, organization, or movement.” 40 U.S.C. § 6135. The district court found the statute 
was overbroad insofar as it covered the plaza, which looks and functions as a public meeting 
space and, with respect to the plaza, applies regardless of whether the Supreme Court is 
actually in session during a particular protest. See Hodge, 799 F.3d 1150, 1154–55. The D.C. 
Circuit made no effort to require the government to tailor § 6135’s speech restrictions 
narrowly to protect the dignity and integrity of the Supreme Court’s oral arguments. See 
generally id. Judge Srikanth Srinivasan, writing for the majority, described the front plaza 
as the private enclave of the Supreme Court, which he characterized as a “nonpublic forum” 
that constitutes “the elevated front porch of the Supreme Court building.” Id. at 1159. Judge 
Srinivasan also dismissed as irrelevant the fact that the Supreme Court Police do not 
consistently seek to enforce the speech ban, routinely permitting some speech activity 
(including large public protests). See id. at 1161–62. Obviously, the selective enforcement 
of a speech ban on public property raises a serious danger of content- and viewpoint-based 
discrimination against particular speakers and messages. I do not suggest that the federal 
government cannot declare the Supreme Court building itself off-limits to expressive 
activity, including noisy protests, but to extend the ban to a broad space generally entirely 
open and available to the public, and to characterize it as the Justices’ private “front porch,” 
reflects a gross disregard for the practical ability of ordinary citizens to participate in the 
process of democratic deliberation. Id. at 1159. Cf. id. at 1160 (“[T]he Supreme Court plaza’s 
status as a nonpublic forum is unaffected by the public’s unrestricted access to the plaza at 
virtually any time.”). That Judge Srinivasan, a federal appellate judge often mentioned as a 
potential Supreme Court nominee for a presumably progressive Democratic president, could 
write such a speech-hostile opinion demonstrates quite clearly that contemporary judicial 
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Burger Court eras, federal courts more often than not began their First 
Amendment analysis in cases involving denials of access to government 
property by assuming a general duty on the part of the government to make 
public property available for First Amendment activity—provided that the 
proposed use was otherwise compatible with the property’s more regular uses.16 
Today, by way of contrast, the burden has shifted to would-be speakers to show 
that government property constitutes a traditional public forum or a designated 
public forum. This shift in the burden of proof means that Warren Court 
decisions involving the use of public property for speech activity would not be 
decided in favor of would-be speakers today.17 
Under the Warren Court’s approach, a public library could be used for a 
silent protest against segregation; it is doubtful that federal courts would reach 
the same result under the public forum doctrine.18 So too, during the Burger 
Court era, a military base could be used as a place to protest the Vietnam War.19 
It is highly doubtful that the contemporary Supreme Court would reach the same 
result under the public forum doctrine. During the Warren and Burger Court 
eras, the First Amendment analysis generally required the government to justify 
proscribing or restricting speech on its property—rather than requiring a would-
be speaker to establish that the particular real property at issue constituted either 
a traditional or designated public forum.20 
                                                                                                                     
antipathy toward would-be speakers seeking to use public property for First Amendment 
activity is widespread and knows no ideological limits. See Julie Zauzmer, What Would a 
Hindu Justice Mean for the Supreme Court?, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/03/10/what-would-a-hindu-
justice-mean-for-the-supreme-court/?utm_term=.a279133bbb4d [https://perma.cc/4WZG-
LW93]. 
 16 See infra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 17 Cf. Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 105–09 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (holding that 
the First Amendment required Alabama to make a major U.S. highway available for the 
Selma-to-Montgomery March, a multi-day protest event, because the location had a direct 
link to the legal wrongs being protested and also constituted a proportionate response to these 
legal wrongs, and ordering the state to make its property available for the protest march and 
rally). 
 18 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 138–40 (1966); see Zick, Expressive Topography, 
supra note 14, at 497 (“Under current forum analysis, the library, like most contested places, 
would most likely be considered a ‘non-public’ forum. This approach fails to place the 
library in local and more general historical perspective.”). 
 19 Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972) (per curiam). Base officials 
prohibited John Flower from distributing anti-Vietnam War leaflets at Fort Sam Houston, in 
San Antonio, Texas. See United States v. Flower, 452 F.2d 80, 81–82, 89 (5th Cir. 1971), 
rev’d, 407 U.S. 197 (1972). The Fifth Circuit held that the government could prohibit speech 
activity on the base, see id. at 82–86, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Flower 
had a First Amendment right to use the base’s property to leaflet and promote an anti-
Vietnam War rally. See Flower, 407 U.S. at 198. 
 20 See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 182–84 (1983); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
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For example, it would be easy to characterize a prison, in categorical terms, 
as a kind of First Amendment dead zone. Yet, the Burger Court did not take this 
approach.21 Instead of holding that prison officials may ban or restrict speech 
activities without being responsible for respecting First Amendment values 
because a prison is neither a public forum nor a designated public forum, the 
Supreme Court instead held that “a prison inmate retains those First Amendment 
rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system.”22 
Under this approach, “challenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to 
inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate 
policies and goals of the corrections system.”23 To be sure, the majority in Pell 
rejected the specific claim at bar—the right of a prisoner to participate in an in-
person, face-to-face interview with a journalist.24 Nevertheless, the locus of the 
expressive conduct—a prison—did not entirely foreclose the First Amendment 
claim from being considered on the merits and the government had to shoulder 
a significant burden of justification to prohibit otherwise protected First 
Amendment activity.25 
Today, however, the baseline has shifted—and shifted rather dramatically. 
Would-be speakers are largely limited to using property of the government’s 
own choosing for their speech activity—and must do so at a time when the 
government deems it convenient to make the property available for speech 
activity.26 If the government designates particular public property a nonpublic 
forum, any speech regulations that can be characterized as “reasonable” are 
                                                                                                                     
 21 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. at 827–28. It bears noting that the prison did not bar alternative forms of 
communication between inmates and members of the press—such as through written letters 
and presumably also telephone calls. Id. at 827–29. 
 25 Id. at 822. By way of contrast, the Supreme Court’s current approach to substantive 
due process and equal protection-based challenges to economic and social legislation reflects 
a posture of abject deference to the government, which has no burden of justification 
whatsoever. See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–16 (1993). Instead, a 
plaintiff challenging economic or social legislation that does not burden or abridge a 
fundamental right must prove a negative—namely that no rational legislator could find that 
the law in question bears a rational relationship to any legitimate state interest. See id. at 313 
(“In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along 
suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal 
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 
a rational basis for the classification.”). Pell’s approach simply does not reflect a similar 
level of deference to prison officials with respect to the First Amendment rights of prisoners. 
See Pell, 417 U.S. at 826–28. 
 26 See Abu El-Haj, supra note 14, at 548–54, 586–88. Professor Abu El-Haj posits that 
“there is good reason to think that current regulatory choices are undermining the 
meaningfulness of public assemblies for participants as well as their effectiveness as a 
mechanism to influence and check government.” Id. at 587. 
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perfectly constitutional.27 Government may also create spaces that are reserved 
either for particular speakers or particular messages (or both). Limited-purpose 
public forums, such as a theater dedicated to presenting theatrical performances 
suitable for children, may exclude categorically proposed speech that falls 
outside the designated users or purposes.28 A forum created for a particular 
group of speakers, for example current students at a state-operated college or 
university, may be categorically closed to local townsfolk.29 Thus, the 
government as property owner often enjoys a freedom of action that mirrors that 
of a private land owner. 
It is easy enough to say, “But if it is the government’s property, why 
shouldn’t the government be permitted to decide by whom it may be used and 
for what purposes it may be used?” The answer to this question is both simple 
and straightforward: government as a property owner should not be able to 
leverage its ownership of property to burden or prevent the expression of 
dissenting voices.30 First Amendment doctrine should reflect a fundamental 
social commitment to facilitating the process of democratic self-government in 
order to ensure that “everything worth saying shall be said.”31 If, as Professor 
Alexander Meiklejohn posited, “[t]he principle of the freedom of speech springs 
from the necessities of the program of self-government,”32 then courts 
committed to enforcing First Amendment values should analyze government 
actions through the prism of whether they advance, or impede, the ongoing 
process of democratic deliberation. My thesis in this Article is that the approach 
used by the Warren and Burger Courts advanced these values, whereas the 
                                                                                                                     
 27 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“[T]he government 
may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”). 
 28 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46–47 (1983). 
But cf. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555–61 (1975) (rejecting a city’s effort 
to limit the kinds of programming that could be presented at a municipally-owned and 
operated performing arts space because the use restrictions constituted impermissible prior 
restraints). 
 29 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 668–70 (2010) (recognizing that government entities can and do 
create limited-purpose public forums and may limit access to such forums to certain speakers 
and particular kinds of speech without violating the First Amendment); Lyrissa Lidsky, 
Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 1984–86 (2011) (describing and discussing the 
concept of a limited-purpose public forum and its application in Christian Legal Society). 
 30 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 10–
12, 33–35, 41–48 (1999) (proposing a general interpretative approach to enforcing the First 
Amendment that privileges speech of a dissenting cast and arguing that dissent lies “at the 
heart of the First Amendment”). Professor Shiffrin explains that “[m]y suggestion will be 
that a free speech theory accenting protection for dissent fares better than a theory based in 
the protection of political speech or liberty.” Id. at 33; see id. at 91 (“Free speech theory 
should be taken beyond protecting or tolerating dissent: the First Amendment should be 
taken to reflect a constitutional commitment to promoting dissent.”). 
 31 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 
25 (1948). 
 32 Id. at 26. 
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approach currently in vogue, and which came to full flower during the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts, does not.33 
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part II begins by considering some 
iconic decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts.34 Because the Warren Court 
decisions often involved speech associated with the civil rights movement, it 
would be reasonable to question whether or not the outcomes reflect a 
generalized commitment to making public property available for speech activity 
or rather targeted support of a cause that most of the incumbent Justices 
subjectively supported.35 However, later judicial decisions, issued during the 
Burger Court era, did not involve civil rights protesters or efforts to end Jim 
Crow and racial segregation and, yet, still generally used the same open-ended 
balancing approach to resolve disputes about access to government property for 
speech activity—with the government having to shoulder the burden of 
justifying denials of access to public property for speech activity.36 Indeed, even 
in cases involving locations such as prisons and military bases, the Burger Court 
used a balancing approach—rather than a categorical approach—to determine 
whether the government has a First Amendment obligation to make its property 
available for speech activity.37 
The Article continues, in Part III, by contrasting the more categorical 
approach of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, which relies on an initial 
characterization of particular government-owned property to prefigure the 
extent to which the government must make it available for private speech 
activity.38 Moreover, even if this initial analysis leads to the conclusion that 
property should generally be available for speech activity, a second level of 
analysis considers whether government restrictions on expressive activity using 
the property are content and viewpoint neutral and constitute reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions.39 To state the matter simply, the tables have 
turned and the burden has shifted from the government to justify restricting 
speech on its property to would-be speakers to prove that they have a legal right 
to use the property for speech activity. 
                                                                                                                     
 33 For a history of the public forum doctrine’s theoretical and doctrinal origins and 
development into the early years of the Rehnquist Court, see generally Robert C. Post, 
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 
UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
 34 See infra notes 58–82 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 58–73 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra Part III. 
 39 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our cases make clear, 
however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on 
the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’” (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). 
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Part IV considers how First Amendment values could be better secured and 
advanced if the federal courts were to move the analytical baseline back toward 
the more speech-friendly approach of the Warren and Burger Courts.40 Simply 
put, the government should always have to shoulder the burden of justifying 
why public property cannot be made available for private speech activity. I do 
not suggest that no categorical rules should exist—some government spaces, for 
example, a judge’s chambers, should be subject to categorical exclusions from 
use for expressive activities. However, the governing doctrinal framework 
should presume a generalized duty on the government’s part to facilitate, rather 
than impede, activities protected under the First Amendment. More specifically, 
federal courts should not use a historical approach to determine whether a 
particular kind of government property should be available for private speech 
activity but instead should revert back to the functional approach that the 
Warren and Burger Courts routinely deployed.41 
Finally, Part V offers a brief summary and overview of the arguments set 
forth in this Article.42 The First Amendment decisions of the Warren and Burger 
Courts imposed affirmative obligations on the government to facilitate speech 
activity by providing access to government-owned property—even when 
government officials would have preferred to deny the would-be protesters 
access. Today, however, the government enjoys broad discretion to ban protests 
from public property—even from property like national parks and public 
memorials that would otherwise seem to constitute traditional public forums.43 
Moreover, even in a traditional public forum, the contemporary federal courts 
routinely have sustained content neutral, reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions that significantly restrict the availability of public property for 
speech activity.44 
                                                                                                                     
 40 See infra Part IV. 
 41 Cf. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) 
(holding that an airport concourse does not constitute a public forum and, accordingly, that 
the government may impose reasonable speech regulations that restrict or prohibit speech 
activity within the concourse area—even though it otherwise functions in many respects as 
a de facto government-owned and operated shopping mall). 
 42 See infra Part V. 
 43 See, e.g., Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding 
a ban on protest activity at the Jefferson Memorial). For a relevant discussion, see Zick, 
Expressive Topography, supra note 14, at 487–505 (discussing the relevance of particular 
spaces and access to specific potential audiences to expressive activity and arguing that even 
though spaces are not inherently fungible, current First Amendment time, place, and manner 
jurisprudence presumes one space is just as good as another for expressive activity). 
Professor Zick argues that “[c]ourts should again be thinking in terms of the new expressive 
topography when assessing spatial adequacy. Places are unique.” Id. at 504. It necessarily 
follows that “denying access to contested places is a substantial restraint on messages 
targeting those places.” Id. 
 44 See, e.g., United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 222 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding 
National Park Service TPM regulations that severely limited protest activity within the St. 
Louis Arch park). 
790 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
If we truly believe that a well-functioning democratic polity requires a 
vibrant ongoing dialogue among citizens about government and its officers,45 
including a strong, if not unyielding, commitment to protecting the freedom of 
political speech,46 then the federal courts must require the government to make 
more public spaces available for public protest and to do so more reliably. 
Simply put, ownership of property should not be a de facto precondition of 
participating in the process of democratic deliberation. 
II. FACILITATING DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATION BY PROVIDING WOULD-
BE SPEAKERS WITH ACCESS TO PUBLIC PROPERTY FOR EXPRESSIVE 
ACTIVITIES: A POSITIVE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS TO 
GOVERNMENT PROPERTY UNDER THE WARREN AND BURGER COURTS 
The Supreme Court, in the nineteenth century, took the view that 
government, as the owner of a property interest, could regulate the use of its 
property more-or-less exactly as a private property owner could manage its 
property.47 Consistent with this logic, if the government possesses the power to 
close property that it owns entirely to speech activity, then it should hold a 
concomitant power to decide what kinds of expressive activity it will tolerate on 
its property. As then-Justice, and later Chief Justice, Edward D. White explained 
in Davis, “The right to absolutely exclude all right to use, necessarily includes 
the authority to determine under what circumstances such use may be availed 
of, as the greater power contains the lesser.”48 This perspective reflects the view 
that government, as the owner of real property, has the constitutional power to 
decide what uses it will permit on what is, after all, the government’s property.49 
Over time, however, the Supreme Court came to reject the analogy of the 
government to a private property owner and began to require the government to 
make public spaces available for First Amendment activities. Thus, in Hague v. 
Committee for Industrial Organization, the Justices squarely rejected a claim 
more-or-less identical to the government’s claim in Davis and, if not expressly 
                                                                                                                     
 45 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964). 
 46 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458–61 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–56 (1988). For a general discussion of how and why contemporary 
First Amendment law disallows the regulation of offensive or outrageous speech, either 
directly or through the imposition of civil liability by juries, see Robert C. Post, The 
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, 
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 624–32 (1990). 
 47 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47–48 (1897). 
 48 Id. at 48. 
 49 This view has resurfaced from time to time in majority opinions. See, e.g., Lyng v. 
Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (“The Constitution does 
not permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as 
sacred, and a law prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area 
would raise a different set of constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have 
to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use 
what is, after all, its land.”). 
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overruling it, signaled that Davis’s approach no longer commanded a majority 
of the Court.50 
Writing for a plurality, but with a majority supporting this portion of his 
opinion, Justice Owen Roberts explained that the First Amendment limits the 
government’s authority to regulate its real property in ways that impede 
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment. He explained that: 
We have no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the Davis 
case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the instant case. 
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from 
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of 
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and 
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in 
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in 
subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with 
peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged 
or denied.51 
In other words, the government, in its capacity as a property owner, must make 
real property available for expressive activities—even if it would prefer not to 
do so. This approach clearly gives the First Amendment a significant 
affirmative, or positive aspect; the Free Speech and Assembly Clauses do not 
merely prevent the government from acting to prohibit speech and assembly, 
but also require the government to lend its affirmative assistance to such 
activities. 
Thus, unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights—indeed, even other 
provisions of the First Amendment itself, such as the Press Clause—the Free 
Speech and Assembly Clauses empower citizens to make positive demands of 
assistance, in the form of access to government-owned property, for speech 
activity. Although Justice Roberts does not directly link this obligation to 
provide affirmative support to expressive activities to the project of democratic 
self-government, his language plainly acknowledges the relationship between 
speech and assembly, on the one hand, and democratic self-government, on the 
other.52 After all “views on national questions” and discussion of “public 
questions” plainly relate to the process of democratic deliberation that is 
necessary to sustain democratic self-government.53 Under the animating theory 
of Hague, the government must afford the general public access to public spaces 
for the purpose of exercising their First Amendment rights.54 
                                                                                                                     
 50 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16, 524–25 (1939). 
 51 Id. at 515–16. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
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Subsequent cases make clear that the right to use public property for 
expressive activities is not without boundaries. To redeploy a phrase first used 
in the Supreme Court’s seminal regulatory takings precedent, “[g]overnment 
hardly could go on”55 if any and every citizen could demand, at will, access to 
public property for the purpose of engaging in speech activity. Hague cannot 
mean that the imperatives of the government as a manager can never take 
precedence over the interests of would-be speakers who seek access to public 
property for speech activity. However, the question is where the burden in such 
cases should fall. Should it rest with the government to show that particular 
property cannot be used for speech activity without impeding the legitimate 
managerial imperatives of the government?56 Or rather, on a would-be speaker 
to show that the government has traditionally permitted particular property to 
be used for First Amendment activities? 
Throughout the civil rights movement, the Supreme Court generally 
vindicated the use of government property for speech activity—even if the 
property did not constitute what contemporary jurisprudence would call a 
“traditional public forum.”57 For example, a public library is not self-evidently 
a place that, since time immemorial, has been available for protest activity. Yet, 
the Supreme Court rejected a claim that a local government could seek to 
enforce a trespass claim against civil rights protesters who held a protest in a 
racially segregated, local public library.58 So too, South Carolina had a duty to 
make available the grounds surrounding the state capitol building, even though 
these grounds were not routinely used for mass protests.59 The Supreme Court 
also invalidated criminal convictions against civil rights protesters who marched 
from Louisiana’s old state capitol building to the local parish (county) 
courthouse to protest the arrest of student activists who had sought to 
desegregate local lunch counters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.60 
Cox v. Louisiana is highly instructive because the majority opinion, 
authored by Justice Arthur Goldberg, considers the ability of the government to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the public courts of law, but concludes that, as 
applied, a law aimed at protecting courts from the influence of fixed pickets 
violated the First Amendment.61 The protesters’ facial challenge to the 
                                                                                                                     
 55 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922); see Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State 
Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (“There must be a limit to individual 
argument in such matters if government is to go on.”). 
 56 ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 4–10, 13–16, 237–47, 261–62 (1995). 
 57 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990) (holding that “[t]he mere 
physical characteristics of the property cannot dictate forum analysis” and explaining that 
“regulation of speech activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First 
Amendment activity is examined only for reasonableness”). 
 58 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966). 
 59 See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235–37 (1963). 
 60 Cox v. Louisiana (Cox I), 379 U.S. 536, 538–44, 552, 558 (1965); Cox. v. Louisiana 
(Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 573 (1965). 
 61 Cox II, 379 U.S. at 573. 
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Louisiana law failed because the state possessed a strong interest in preventing 
political pressures from being brought to bear on the administrative of justice. 
Justice Goldberg explained that: 
There can be no question that a State has a legitimate interest in protecting its 
judicial system from the pressures which picketing near a courthouse might 
create. Since we are committed to a government of laws and not of men, it is 
of the utmost importance that the administration of justice be absolutely fair 
and orderly. This Court has recognized that the unhindered and untrammeled 
functioning of our courts is part of the very foundation of our constitutional 
democracy.62 
Accordingly, the state could, consistent with the First Amendment, enact a 
general proscription against fixed pickets at courthouses, so long as the 
measures adopted are “necessary and appropriate to assure that the 
administration of justice at all stages is free from outside control and influence,” 
and provided that the statute is “narrowly drawn” to achieve these objectives.63 
Justice Goldberg’s analysis, however, involves an open-ended balancing of 
the government’s interest in safeguarding the impartial administration of justice 
and the interest of would-be protesters in maintaining a fixed picket near a 
courthouse.64 In considering an “as applied” challenge to the application of the 
statute on the facts at bar, Justice Goldberg rejected the argument that any and 
every protest proximate to a courthouse will be prejudicial to the fair and orderly 
administration of justice.65 He also carefully considered precisely how and when 
the protest took place: “It is undisputed that the demonstration took place on the 
west sidewalk, the far side of the street, exactly 101 feet from the courthouse 
steps and, judging from the pictures in the record, approximately 125 feet from 
the courthouse itself.”66 Thus, the demonstration was merely “near” and not “in” 
the courthouse.67 Government officials also had specifically authorized a protest 
directly across the street from the courthouse grounds.68 These factors, 
considered together and in context, required reversal of the convictions on an 
as-applied basis.69 
Justice Hugo L. Black, by way of contrast, agreed that the breach of peace 
convictions were invalid, but dissented from the majority’s conclusion that the 
as-applied challenge to Louisiana’s ban on protests near courthouses possessed 
merit.70 He noted that the statute in question, § 14:401, made it unlawful for any 
person to stage a demonstration proximate to a courthouse with the intent of 
                                                                                                                     
 62 Id. at 562. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 565–68. 
 65 See id. at 567. 
 66 Id. at 568. 
 67 Cox II, 379 U.S. at 568. 
 68 Id. at 569–70. 
 69 Id. at 574–75. 
 70 Id. at 580–83 (Black, J. dissenting). 
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influencing judges and other court officials regarding a pending judicial 
matter.71 Justice Black emphasized that this statute prohibited “anyone, under 
any conditions, [from] picket[ing] or parad[ing] near a courthouse, residence or 
other building used by a judge, juror, witness, or court officer, ‘with the intent 
of influencing’ any of them.”72 He emphasized that the law sought to protect the 
judicial process itself “from the intimidation and dangers that inhere in huge 
gatherings at courthouse doors and jail doors to protest arrests and to influence 
court officials in performing their duties.”73 
Thus, Justice Black argued for a more categorical approach to making 
government property available for protest activity—and, in Black’s view, a 
courthouse, and environs surrounding it, could be constitutionally declared “off 
limits” for speech activity.74 Justice Black would have upheld this regulation 
even though the protest at issue took place near a local courthouse but outside 
regular business hours, and, therefore, did not pose much of a threat of undue 
influence.75 And, even though other forms of expressive conduct, such as 
buying television ads, radio spots, or outdoor billboards attacking a particular 
judge or urging a particular result in a pending case, could present no-less-direct 
a threat to the integrity of the judicial process, they would have fallen outside 
the letter of the Louisiana statute.76 The Louisiana law was plainly both over 
inclusive (because it prohibited protests when judicial personnel were absent) 
and under inclusive (because it did not regulate other speech activity that might 
unduly influence judges or court personnel regarding pending judicial business). 
The majority’s approach, unlike Justice Black’s approach, uses an open-
ended balancing test to resolve the relative equities on the facts presented. 
Because local government officials had approved a location for the protest 
almost identical to the location actually used, the government’s claim that it had 
a pressing need to banish the protest from the area near the courthouse rang 
entirely hollow.77 After all, if one side of the street was appropriate for a mass 
meeting and protest featuring 2,000 participants, then so too was the other. 
Justice Goldberg’s approach obviously suffers from the risk of subjective 
application of the balancing test—if a judge were hostile to the message 
protesters sought to propagate, she could put her thumb on the scale when 
assessing the risk the protest presented. 
This is, to be sure, a nontrivial shortcoming of an open-ended balancing test 
to determine the suitability of public property for First Amendment activities.78 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Id. at 581–82; LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401 (2004). 
 72 Cox II, 379 U.S. at 581–82 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401). 
 73 Id. at 583. 
 74 See id. 
 75 See id. at 584. 
 76 See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:401. 
 77 Cox II, 379 U.S. at 569–72. 
 78 See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS 
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A 
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES 204–05 (2012). 
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A less categorical approach to determining whether public property should be 
available for would-be protesters presents a risk of enabling stealth content- or 
viewpoint-based discrimination by federal judges.79 This problem of judicial 
discretion is no greater, however, than in other contexts, such as how to 
categorize speech for purposes of applying the First Amendment. 
For example, the categorization of speech as “political,” “commercial,” or 
“obscene” often prefigures its protected or unprotected status under the First 
Amendment.80 Applying categorical labels to particular examples of speech 
activity involves no less judicial discretion than would the task of assessing 
whether proposed speech activity is consistent, or inconsistent, with the more 
regular uses of the particular public property at issue.81 A balancing approach 
that weighs the interests of would-be speakers against the interests of the 
government in reserving property for its more regular uses means that any and 
all government property could, at least in theory, be available to support 
expressive activities.82 
To be sure, the government’s interest in reserving some public property 
exclusively for the government’s use will be impossible to overcome—for 
example, a judge’s chambers or a district attorney’s office. Even so, however, a 
balancing exercise could work. As I have argued previously, “[a]lthough this 
exercise creates the possibility of unfairness in individual cases,” the potential 
benefits of this approach, “more than offset this opportunity cost.”83 In sum, the 
distinct virtue of Justice Goldberg’s approach is that it forces the government to 
make a convincing case that it has a good reason for denying access to the 
property that the protesters seek to use; the burden rests on the state to justify a 
denial of access, rather than on would-be protesters to establish an affirmative 
and general right to use the public property for speech activity. 
Other properties will obviously be off limits during some periods of time—
for example, the government’s interest in using a high school building for 
educational activities would outweigh the interest of would-be protesters in 
using the building for a political rally during periods when classes are actually 
in session. But what about periods, such as the summer break, when the high 
school is not being used for classes and sits more or less empty and unused? Or 
periods of the day during the school year when the high school is not being used 
for instructional activities, such as in the evenings or during the weekend? 
                                                                                                                     
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. at 202–05. 
 82 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859–60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that “the notion of ‘public forum’ has never been the touchstone of public expression, for a 
contrary approach blinds the Court to any possible accommodation of First Amendment 
values in this case” and positing that “[t]hose cases permitting public expression without 
characterizing the locale involved as a public forum, together with those cases recognizing 
the existence of a public forum, albeit qualifiedly, evidence the desirability of a flexible 
approach to determining when public expression should be protected”). 
 83 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 205. 
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Should a local school board be able to say “our high school auditorium is a non-
public forum” and deny access to anyone seeking to use it for First Amendment 
activities? Even if it constitutes the only facility of its kind in a remote, rural 
community? And, even if the school board permits its use for noneducational 
functions, such as serving as an official polling place for primary and general 
elections? 
Lest a skeptical reader think that the Warren and Burger Courts deployed 
this balancing approach solely for the benefit of civil rights groups whose goals 
and objectives enjoyed the personal support of the Justices comprising the 
majority, the practice of using an open-ended balancing test to determine 
whether the government could deny access to its property continued well into 
the 1970s and was applied in cases having little or nothing to do with civil rights 
protesters.84 Moreover, the Supreme Court used this approach in cases seeking 
court-mandated access to publicly-owned venues for speech activities that were 
even less plausible than a sidewalk adjacent to a county courthouse.85 
III. THE PUBLIC FORUM AND TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER DOCTRINES 
VEST GOVERNMENT WITH BROAD DISCRETION TO LIMIT OR PROHIBIT 
SPEECH ACTIVITY ON PUBLIC PROPERTY 
In the 1970s, even as a majority of the Burger Court continued to use an 
open-ended balancing test to determine whether government property should be 
available for First Amendment activities, then-Associate Justice William 
Rehnquist argued, initially in dissent, but eventually in majority opinions, that 
a more categorical approach was needed to vindicate the government’s 
legitimate managerial interests.86 By the 1980s, and his promotion to the Chief 
Justice’s office, these views regularly came to command a majority of the 
Justices.87 Instead of squarely placing a burden of justification on the 
government when it denied access to public property for speech activity, the 
Supreme Court instead required would-be speakers to establish that the property 
                                                                                                                     
 84 See supra notes 19–25; see infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text. 
 86 For an excellent discussion of how the government’s role as a manager could justify 
at least some speech restrictions in government workplaces and on government property, see 
generally Robert C. Post, Essay, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996). 
 87 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725–28 (1990). Two decisions in 
the late Burger Court period embrace the public forum doctrine. See Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (“[T]he Court has adopted a forum 
analysis as a means of determining when the Government’s interest in limiting the use of its 
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing to use the property 
for other purposes.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 
(1983) (“Public property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public 
communication is governed by different standards. We have recognized that the ‘First 
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled 
by the government.’” (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 
U.S. 114, 129 (1981))). 
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that they wished to use constituted either a public forum or a designated public 
forum.88 
By the 1990s, spaces that clearly could be used for expressive activities, 
such as airport concourses, were judicially declared to be off limits, nonpublic 
forums, and closed to speech activity.89 In addition to an increasingly restrictive 
definition of public forums, the Supreme Court also adopted a test for analyzing 
restrictions on the use of public forums that allowed very broad restrictions on 
speech activity within traditional and designated public forums.90 The combined 
screening effects of a very limited universe of highly regulated public forums 
and designated public forums significantly restricted the public property 
potentially available to host First Amendment activities. 
In fairness, a turn toward a more categorical approach to determining 
whether the First Amendment requires the government to make public property 
available for speech activity first appeared during the Burger Court’s later 
years91 and continued to gain jurisprudential traction into the 1980s.92 By the 
early 1980s, the public forum doctrine was sufficiently well-established that 
Justice Byron White, in Perry, was able to read existing precedents as creating 
three, and possibly four, typologies of government property.93 Nevertheless, the 
public forum doctrine did not reach full flower until the Rehnquist Court.94 
Although some legal scholars point to decisions such as Southeastern 
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad95 and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights96 as 
constituting the Supreme Court’s initial embrace of the public forum doctrine, 
these decisions, in point of fact, did not establish the rigid public forum doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 88 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46. 
 89 See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679–83 
(1992). 
 90 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 91 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–48. 
 92 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800–06. 
 93 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46, 46 n.7. 
 94 See infra notes 100–31 and accompanying text. 
 95 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). 
 96 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
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enforced by the federal courts today.97 Later decisions, such as Greer v. Spock,98 
reverted to the more open-ended balancing test used in cases like Brown v. 
Louisiana.99 Until the 1980s, the suggestion that the government could 
categorically exclude speech from its property unless the property constituted a 
traditional public forum or a designated public forum appeared exclusively in 
dissenting opinions.100 
                                                                                                                     
 97 See, e.g., Post, supra note 33, at 1733–39. Professor Post points to Greer v. Spock, 
424 U.S. 828 (1976), as “[t]he pivotal decision” in the development of the public forum 
doctrine. See Post, supra note 33, at 1739. Viewed from the vantage point of doctrinal 
developments in 1987, this proposition seems quite reasonable—after all, Greer was the first 
case to invoke the metaphor of a “public forum” in a majority opinion. Greer, 424 U.S. at 
838. Nevertheless, as I explain in some detail below, Greer actually used a balancing, rather 
than a categorical, approach to determining whether the government had an obligation to 
make particular property available for speech activity. See infra note 98. It is certainly fair 
to posit that Greer constitutes the first majority Supreme Court opinion that adopted the 
nomenclature of the “public forum,” but Greer’s application of the doctrine, in hindsight, 
was considerably more demanding of the government than later applications of the more 
fully developed public forum doctrine. See infra notes 122 and 139 and accompanying text. 
 98 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). To be sure, Justice Potter Stewart’s majority 
opinion in Greer makes a passing reference to the concept of certain government property 
constituting a public forum. Id. at 836 (“The Court of Appeals was mistaken, therefore, in 
thinking that the Flower case is to be understood as announcing a new principle of 
constitutional law, and mistaken specifically in thinking that Flower stands for the principle 
that whenever members of the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated 
by the Government, then that place becomes a ‘public forum’ for purposes of the First 
Amendment. Such a principle of constitutional law has never existed, and does not exist 
now.”). Despite on offhand reference to government property as a public forum, Justice 
Stewart’s opinion carefully weighs the government’s asserted interests for prohibiting a 
partisan political rally from a suburban New Jersey army base—it does not simply declare 
the base to be a nonpublic forum and sustain the government’s speech restrictions. See id. at 
837–40. Thus, although Greer does feature the phrase “public forum,” the case itself does 
not actually adopt a rigid, categorical approach to analyzing whether the government has an 
obligation to make property available for speech activity. But see Post, supra note 33, at 
1739–43 (arguing that Greer laid the theoretical and doctrinal foundation for the 
development of the public forum doctrine). Professor Post suggests that “Greer’s 
resurrection of the major premise of the Davis syllogism was decisive for the future 
development of public forum doctrine, although the Court made no effort constitutionally to 
explain or justify its use of the premise.” Id. at 1743. This is undoubtedly true—Greer does 
not proceed from a strong presumption that government property otherwise suitable for 
proposed speech activity must be made available to the would-be speakers. Even so, 
however, Greer demands far more by way of government justification than later cases, such 
as Cornelius, which requires nothing more than that speech regulations in nonpublic forums 
be “reasonable.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797, 
800–01, 806–07 (1985). 
 99 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–43 (1966). 
 100 See, e.g., Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 199–200 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
2017] OUR SHRINKING FIRST AMENDMENT 799 
Justice Hugo Black pioneered the argument that the government could 
exclude speech from public property if the property did not constitute a 
traditional public forum. He made this argument in very strong terms in Cox II, 
but in dissent. Black argued in Cox II that a categorical proscription against 
protest activity proximate to courthouses did not offend the First Amendment: 
“Justice cannot be rightly administered, nor are the lives and safety of prisoners 
secure, where throngs of people clamor against the processes of justice right 
outside the courthouse or jailhouse doors.”101 
Similarly, Justice William Rehnquist advocated a categorical approach to 
evaluating denials of access to government property in cases presenting 
government efforts to prohibit speech activity on public property. Justice 
Rehnquist began to sketch his vision of the public forum doctrine in his 
dissenting opinion in Flower, a case that invalidated a ban against leafletting on 
a portion of a military base in San Antonio, Texas, that was generally open to 
the public.102 
Then-Justice, and later Chief Justice, Rehnquist argued that: 
[C]ivilian authorities may draw reasonable distinctions, based on the purpose 
for which public buildings and grounds are used, in according the right to 
exercise First Amendment freedoms in such buildings and on such grounds. 
Simply because some activities and individuals are allowed on government 
property does not require the abandonment of otherwise allowable restrictions 
on its use.103 
Harking back to the reasoning of Davis, the government as a property owner 
may select the kinds and scope of expressive activity that it will permit on its 
property.104 
Two years later, Justice Rehnquist renewed his effort to reduce the 
imposition of involuntary First Amendment easements on government-owned 
property. His dissenting opinion in Southeastern Promotions makes a largely 
identical argument to his Flower dissent, namely, that “if it is the desire of the 
citizens of Chattanooga, who presumably have paid for and own the facilities, 
that the attractions to be shown there should not be of the kind which would 
offend any substantial number of potential theatergoers,” then the city should be 
able to refuse to rent the venue for the purpose of mounting a racy, adult-
oriented traveling production of the musical Hair.105 In other words, if the 
government creates a forum for expressive activity, then the government may 
decide both who may use the forum and the expressive purposes for which it 
may be used. 
                                                                                                                     
 101 Cox II, 379 U.S. at 583 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 102 Flower, 407 U.S. at 199–200 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 103 Id. at 200. 
 104 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). 
 105 Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 572 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
800 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 78:4 
It was not until 1983, and Justice Byron White’s opinion for a five-to-four 
majority in Perry, that the public forum doctrine enjoyed a full explication and 
the clear support of a majority.106 Justice White’s Perry opinion organizes 
earlier cases into categories and posits the existence of three, or perhaps four, 
distinct classes of public property: (1) traditional public forums, (2) designated 
public forums, (3) and nonpublic forums.107 Justice White hints at a fourth 
category—a limited-purpose public forum—and subsequent cases have made 
clear that this constitutes a distinct subcategory comprised of forums, whether 
physical or intangible, that the government creates and designates for the 
exclusive use of particular speakers, content, or both.108 In Perry, however, 
Justice White lumps limited-purpose public forums in with designated public 
forums;109 subsequent cases, however, have distinguished them and given the 
government broad authority to subsidize particular speakers or speech.110 
The specific forum at issue in Perry, an internal mail system created and 
maintained by a public school district,111 was not generally open to the public 
and, although not reserved exclusively for internal school district 
communications, was used primarily for official communications between the 
school district’s administration and the district’s employees.112 Even under the 
more open-ended balancing test of Brown v. Louisiana,113 it is doubtful that the 
First Amendment would have supported a generalized right of access by the 
public to the school district’s internal mail system. Indeed, even the dissenting 
Justices in Perry did not posit a universal right of public access, but instead 
argued that an association of teachers seeking to challenge the incumbent 
collective bargaining representative should be granted equal access to the 
internal mail system as the incumbent teachers’ union already enjoyed.114 
Thus, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.’s dissent did not posit that the internal 
mail system should be generically available to any and all comers, but instead 
characterized the exclusion of a rival employees’ union as a form of viewpoint 
discrimination in a forum that had been made available for speech of the sort 
that the rival union wished to propagate.115 Justice Brennan’s dissent also used 
a functional analysis that assessed the compatibility of the proposed speech with 
the particular government-created forum and found that the proposed speech 
                                                                                                                     
 106 See generally Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 37–
55 (1983). 
 107 Id. at 45–46. 
 108 See id. at 46 n.7; see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings 
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679–83 (2010). 
 109 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
 110 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11. 
 111 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 39–40. 
 112 See id. at 47–48. 
 113 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–43 (1966). 
 114 See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 60–62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 115 Id. at 61–62. 
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came within the subject matter of the forum and would not unduly burden its 
use for its more regular purposes.116 
Perry represented a near-complete victory for the Black/Rehnquist 
categorical approach to assessing whether particular public property should, in 
general, be available to the public for the exercise of First Amendment rights. 
Subsequent cases, decided under the Rehnquist Court, quickly consolidated this 
doctrinal innovation and ossified it. The Supreme Court narrowly defined the 
concept of a public forum and used a very strict, tradition- and history-based 
approach to exclude new kinds of forums—such as charitable fundraising drives 
among government workers,117 a sidewalk and parking lot at a post office,118 
and airports.119 Taking quite literally Hague’s language about places that had, 
since time immemorial, been available for use for expressive activities,120 the 
conservative majority recognized very broad government discretion to prohibit 
speech activities on publically-owned property.121 
In short, the Supreme Court increasingly granted the government broad 
authority to determine for itself whether or not its property would be generally 
available for speech activity. It did so, as Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, 
because “[w]here the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal 
operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, 
its action will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as 
a lawmaker may be subject.”122 In other words, managerial imperatives justify 
limiting or even proscribing the use of government property for speech activity. 
Under this approach, the government does not operate under any general duty 
to create free speech easements on its property unless it chooses to do so 
voluntarily (by creating a designated public forum)123 or the property at issue 
constitutes a traditional public forum using a history-based test (which 
categorically excludes new types of government property from ever becoming 
a traditional public forum).124 
Concurrently, with respect to a public forum, the Rehnquist Court adopted 
a policy of sustaining against First Amendment challenges content- and 
                                                                                                                     
 116 See id. at 63–66. 
 117 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
 118 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 729–30 (1990). 
 119 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679–81 (1992). 
 120 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
 121 See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 725–26. 
 122 Int’l Soc’y, 505 U.S. at 678. 
 123 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985) 
(“The Government did not create the CFC [Combined Federal Campaign] for purposes of 
providing a forum for expressive activity. That such activity occurs in the context of the 
forum created does not imply that the forum thereby becomes a public forum for First 
Amendment purposes.”). 
 124 See Int’l Soc’y, 505 U.S. at 680 (“[T]he tradition of airport activity does not 
demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for speech activity. Nor can 
we say that these particular terminals, or airport terminals generally, have been intentionally 
opened by their operators to such activity . . . .”). 
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viewpoint-neutral reasonable time, place, and manner (TPM) regulations.125 
Thus, even if a would-be speaker was able to prevail on the preliminary question 
of whether particular government property should be available for speech 
activity, clearing this initial hurdle was merely a necessary, and not sufficient, 
condition for obtaining access to government property for protest activity.126 
The government retained broad discretion to regulate the terms and conditions 
under which a traditional public forum (or designated public forum) could be 
used for speech activity.127 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in Ward, explained that 
[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions 
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions “are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are 
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they 
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”128 
The Ward test sounds considerably more demanding in theory than it proves to 
be in practice.129 
First, the federal courts do not look very deeply into the government’s actual 
motives for enacting TPM regulations;130 thus, the adoption of limits on protest 
activity near abortion clinics after Operation Rescue comes to town does not 
make TPM regulations content-based.131 Second, the federal courts are not 
terribly demanding regarding either the government’s purpose or the fit between 
the means used to achieve the government’s substantial goal and actual 
                                                                                                                     
 125 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1989). 
 126 Id. 
 127 See id. at 791 (“A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of 
expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages 
but not others.”). 
 128 Id.  
 129 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 27–31 (discussing the insufficiency of the 
standards governing time, place, and manner restrictions). 
 130 See id. at 28–31. 
 131 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719–20, 725–30 (2000). The Hill majority bizarrely 
claimed that a speech ban near abortion clinics was “not a ‘regulation of speech’” but instead 
“a regulation of the places where some speech may occur.” Id. at 719. Similarly, in Turner 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court ignored a clear congressional purpose 
to help propagate particular kinds of programming—namely local programming, educational 
programming, and news and public affairs programming—over other kinds of content and 
used local television stations as a de facto proxy for entities that will create and distribute 
programming of the sort that Congress favored. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 644–48 (1994). But cf. id. at 677–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that the preference for locally-based, educational, and news and 
public affairs programming constituted a government preference for this kind of content and 
rendered the must carry provisions of the Cable Act content-based regulations of speech). 
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attainment of the goal itself.132 Third, and finally, the “ample alternative 
channels for communication” requirement may be satisfied if one could upload 
a blog post to the internet or hand out leaflets somewhere else.133 As I have 
observed previously, “[p]rovided that government is willing to restrict all 
speakers alike, the time, place, and manner doctrine, as explicated in Ward and 
subsequent cases, imposes relatively few absolute limits on such 
regulations.”134 
IV. TOWARD A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO MAKING PUBLIC SPACE 
RELIABLY AVAILABLE FOR SPEECH ACTIVITY 
The Supreme Court’s motive in adopting a categorical approach to define 
and structure the public’s right to use government-owned property for speech 
activity is easy to understand: The public forum doctrine provides bright-line 
rules that are easy to state and relatively easy to apply. Accordingly, lower 
federal and state courts will usually reach the same results regarding the nature 
of a particular forum—whether traditional, designated, limited-purpose, or 
nonpublic. The TPM doctrine also provides an easy to state, and relatively easy 
to apply, framework for determining whether government imposed limits on 
public, designated, and limited-purpose public forums trench too deeply on the 
exercise of expressive freedoms. Both the categorization exercise and the TPM 
doctrine vest the government with substantial managerial discretion to reserve 
public property for the specific purposes that led the government to acquire the 
property in the first place. Given the challenges the government faces in running 
vast bureaucracies, the random use of government property by private citizens 
for speech activity could easily lead to chaos and disruption.135  
In sum, the public forum and TPM doctrines both protect the government’s 
ability to operate its myriad programs on a day-to-day basis. The federal courts 
also have disallowed government efforts to parcel out access to public property 
for speech activity based on the viewpoint or content of the proposed speech 
activity.136 Government officials also must apply TPM regulations with an even 
hand and such regulations must advance an important government interest and 
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.137 It would be wildly 
wide of the mark to suggest that the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have returned 
                                                                                                                     
 132 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 27–28. 
 133 See id. at 27–39. 
 134 Id. at 31. 
 135 See POST, supra note 56, at 237–47 (discussing the dangers of First Amendment 
jurisprudence undermining the government’s ability to attain legitimate, managerial goals). 
 136 Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133–36 (1992). Writing for the 
Forsyth County majority, Justice Harry Blackmun observed that “[t]his Court has held time 
and again: ‘Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the 
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.’” Id. at 135 (quoting 
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1984)). 
 137 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
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the First Amendment baseline to Davis v. Massachusetts.138 Under the existing 
doctrinal rules, the government clearly may not restrict speech on public 
property with as free a hand as a private citizen or corporation may restrict 
speech on privately-owned property. 
Nevertheless, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have reset the balance in 
the government’s favor and have done so to a significant degree. Access to 
government property for expressive activities is considerably more 
circumscribed today than it was in the 1960s or 1970s.139 Persons seeking access 
to government property for speech activity now have to meet an initial burden 
of convincing a court that the specific property they seek to use constitutes a 
traditional or designated public forum—or that it is a limited-purpose public 
forum and the proposed speakers or speech activities fall within the class of 
speakers or speech authorized to use the forum.140 Even if a plaintiff meets this 
initial burden, the government will still prevail if the denial of access results 
from viewpoint- and content-neutral reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions.141 TPM restrictions, aggressively applied, can reduce the space 
available quite considerably—to a small circle or two within a major public 
park, such as the St. Louis Arch, in downtown St. Louis, Missouri.142 
Thus, the problem is two-fold: Federal courts too easily permit the 
government to adopt self-serving classifications of public property that banish 
protesters and protest activity. And, even with respect to public property that 
cannot be entirely closed to speech activity, the government may adopt 
burdensome, and highly effective, regulations that severely limit the availability 
of the property for First Amendment activities. In the days of the Warren and 
Burger Courts, neither of these propositions held true. Government property was 
presumptively available for speech activity, and the government had to establish 
why its proposed use for speech activity constituted too great a burden for the 
government to shoulder.143 Moreover, federal courts viewed efforts to 
aggressively limit use of traditional public forums to prevent speech activity 
with skepticism. Cox v. Louisiana144 provides a good example—if government 
                                                                                                                     
 138 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897). 
 139 Compare Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508–09 
(1969) (holding that public school students may engage in political protest activity while on 
school district property), with Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute that bans protest on the large, 
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 140 See supra notes 108–31 and accompanying text. 
 141 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (“[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions 
on the time, place, or manner of protected speech . . . .”). 
 142 See United States v. Kistner, 68 F.3d 218, 221–22 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 143 See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 144 See generally Cox v. Louisiana (Cox I), 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana (Cox 
II), 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
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officials authorized a protest on one side of a public street proximate to a county 
courthouse, then they could not object to the use of sidewalks on the opposite 
side of the street.145 
To permit a mass protest near a courthouse, on an as applied basis in the 
context of a state law that sought to protect judges and court officials from 
improper influences, constitutes a remarkable commitment to securing and 
advancing First Amendment values. So too, ordering military officials to permit 
protest activity on a military base represents a strikingly broad, and deep, 
commitment to facilitating the process of democratic deliberation that is 
essential to the maintenance of democratic self-government.146 Although the 
Burger Court ultimately declined to extend its initial ruling mandating access to 
military bases for speech activity,147 it did so in an opinion that did not declare, 
in categorical terms, that such facilities may be closed entirely to the public and 
declared free speech-free zones.148 Indeed, the Burger Court even declined to 
adopt a categorical approach to declaring a prison off limits to any and all forms 
of expressive activity.149 
The Warren and Burger Courts essentially treated the First Amendment as 
a font of affirmative, positive obligations on the government to lend its 
assistance to would-be speakers through selective access to government-owned 
property. The government could not pick and choose which speakers and 
messages it would lend its support in the form of access to public property—
instead it had a duty to facilitate all comers. To be sure, this approach had the 
effect of significantly increasing the social cost of speech activity on public 
property.150 When half of a major U.S. highway is used for a major civil rights 
protest, rather than for vehicular traffic, drivers seeking to use the highway to 
get from Point A to Point B incur a nontrivial cost.151 So too, the use of public 
spaces for speech activity makes the space less available for other activities—if 
a group of New Age women descend upon the interior of the Jefferson Memorial 
to dance, the quietude of the interior space is disrupted for those who simply 
wish to contemplate the neo-classical interior and massive sculpture of 
Jefferson.152 
The same, however, could be said of having Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
speak at the rally associated with the iconic August 27–28, 1963, March on 
Washington for Jobs and Freedom, from the interior space of the Lincoln 
                                                                                                                     
 145 Cox II, 379 U.S. at 562, 569–70, 574–75. 
 146 See Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 197–98 (1972) (per curiam). 
 147 See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). 
 148 See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
 149 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 
 150 See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965). 
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 152 But cf. Oberwetter v. Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 552–54 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding a 
government ban on protest within the interior of the Jefferson Memorial because it does not 
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Memorial, to the mass audience attending the rally on the National Mall, and 
also those persons watching King’s speech live on broadcast television.153 
Should the government be free to banish protests from both spaces? On the 
theory that they exist solely for reverential contemplation of Jefferson and 
Lincoln—rather than expressive activities associated with political, ideological, 
or religious beliefs? 
The Warren and Burger Courts were willing to force government entities to 
justify refusals of access to public property with persuasive reasons that 
demonstrated the incompatibility of speech activity with the more regular uses 
of public property. Moreover, during this era, the Supreme Court also 
entertained “as applied” challenges to speech restrictions that were otherwise 
valid on their face—such as proscriptions against efforts to bring extra-judicial 
pressure to bear on state court judges and court personnel.154 In sum, the federal 
courts routinely pushed the government to facilitate speech by making public 
property available for First Amendment activities. 
The contemporary First Amendment demands much less of the government 
with respect to making public property available for private speech. To be sure, 
the government is free to make property available for speech activity, but it has 
a much narrower obligation to do so—both with respect to the kind of property 
it must open to expressive activities and with respect to the terms and conditions 
it imposes on private citizens who wish to use public property for protest.155 Of 
course, if a would-be speaker owns the property necessary to speak, and 
therefore does not require access to government property as a locus for their 
speech, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have aggressively protected the right 
of private property owners to use their property for expressive purposes.156 
The public forum doctrine was firmly established by the final years of the 
Burger Court157 and ossified quickly under the Rehnquist Court.158 Over forty 
                                                                                                                     
 153 Dr. King gave his iconic I Have a Dream speech at the mass outdoor rally on the 
National Mall—a rally that served as the capstone for this event and constituted a pivotal 
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 155 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27, 737 (1990). 
 156 Compare City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 54–55 (1994) (invalidating a ban on 
the placement of lawn signs on private residential property bearing political or ideological 
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 157 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983). 
 158 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678–79 (1992) 
(holding that airport concourses do not constitute public forums and, therefore, government 
may adopt and apply any reasonable restrictions on speech activity on airport grounds). 
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years later, calling for the Supreme Court to abandon completely the public 
forum doctrine is likely to be unsuccessful. Moreover, it is hardly surprising that 
the federal courts would prefer categorical rules that permit the easy and 
consistent disposition of litigation that seeks access to government property for 
speech activity to an open-ended balancing test that requires courts to reconsider 
the availability of public property for speech activity on a case-by-case and ad 
hoc basis. Accordingly, calling for a return to the open-ended balancing 
approach of Brown v. Louisiana will not prove to be a successful strategy for 
making more public property reliably available for First Amendment 
activities.159 
A more realistic alternative to a wholesale repudiation of the public forum 
doctrine would entail finding a mechanism for improving on the existing public 
forum framework. Happily, there are some potential improvements that could 
shift the burden from would-be protesters to prove a constitutional right of 
access to public property to the government to establish a clear legal right to 
deny access to particular property. Indeed, some areas of First Amendment law 
already work in this fashion—for example, the government generally must 
prove that the risk of violence associated with speech activity is so clear and 
present a danger that it justifies silencing an unpopular speaker.160 We do not 
allow the government to establish categorical rules that certain kinds of highly 
unpopular speech may be proscribed because of a risk of unrest or violence; by 
parity of reasoning we should be more willing to require the government to show 
that providing access to particular kinds of government property would be 
unduly disruptive to government operations. 
It also bears noting that the rule against silencing an unpopular speaker 
because of the potential for public disorder, or even violence, also imposes 
significant financial burdens on the government, on an entirely involuntary 
basis, and effectively forces the government to expend scarce resources in order 
to facilitate speech activity in public spaces.161 Police budgets are not infinite 
and the costs of policing radically unpopular speakers could be quite significant. 
Yet, under the First Amendment, the government may not invoke the cost of 
providing protection to unpopular speakers as a basis for requiring them to cease 
speaking.162 In this sense, the First Amendment creates a positive duty on the 
government to facilitate private speech. Moreover, this aspect of the First 
Amendment constitutes well-settled law.163 Access to public property through 
                                                                                                                     
 159 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966). 
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a free speech easement is simply another form of involuntary speech subsidy—
the question that federal judges must ask and answer is the degree to which 
government entities should possess discretion to deny this subsidy to would-be 
speakers. 
The main virtue of the pre-public forum doctrine era cases was a functional 
approach to determining whether public property could be used for First 
Amendment activities.164 Rather than relying on the government’s (potentially 
self-serving) labels for particular property or even on the government’s declared 
purpose for owning property, the federal courts would instead consider the kinds 
of activities the government permitted voluntarily and the consistency, or 
inconsistency, of speech, assembly, petition, and association-related activities 
in those spaces. Even if the Supreme Court retains the public forum framework, 
the question of whether a space constitutes a traditional or designated public 
forum could be determined using a functional approach, rather than a formalistic 
historical approach that would exclude many important public spaces from use 
for protest simply because the spaces did not exist in 1791 (for example, an 
airport or train station).165 
First Amendment values would be better advanced if more government 
property were available for use by private citizens seeking to engage their fellow 
                                                                                                                     
First Amendment” despite a hostile audience reaction); Note, Freedom of Speech and 
Assembly: The Problem of the Hostile Audience, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1118, 1122–23 
(1949) (describing, discussing, and analyzing the then-“relatively neglected” problem of 
permitting a hostile audience’s reaction to serve as a basis for silencing speech and proposing 
that speech should not be proscribed if it is otherwise “independently lawful”). 
 164 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116–17 (1972) (using a functional 
approach focused on “the nature of a place” to determine whether it may be used for public 
protest activity). Justice Marshall emphasized that “[t]he crucial question is whether the 
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place 
at a particular time.” Id. at 116. 
 165 See id. It also bears noting that Justice Kennedy has argued strongly in favor of using 
a functional approach to public forum analysis rather than a rigid historical approach. See 
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693–94 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“Our public forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories 
rather than ideas or convert what was once an analysis protective of expression into one 
which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.”). Kennedy posited that “the 
Court’s public forum analysis in these cases is inconsistent with the values underlying the 
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment.” Id. at 694. He objected that the 
majority’s approach “leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict 
speech on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a nonspeech-related purpose 
for the area, and it leaves almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent 
the rare approval of the government.” Id. at 695. In his view, the determination of whether 
government property constitutes a public forum “must be an objective one, based on the 
actual, physical characteristics and uses of the property.” Id. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s 
approach would consider the actual day-to-day uses of government property rather than the 
label that the government attaches to particular property. Applying this approach, he 
concluded that an airport concourse constitutes a public forum. Id. at 697–703. Justice 
Kennedy’s approach is consistent with the approach of the Warren and Burger Courts in 
cases like Brown, Pell, and Greer. See supra notes 14–25 and accompanying text. 
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citizens over matters of public concern. A more contextualized, functional 
approach to identifying public forums would open up more public property for 
speech activity without forcing federal judges to reinvent the wheel every time 
a would-be protester seeks access to government property that cannot be 
regularly used for speech activity without undermining or precluding the 
government from maintaining its regular operations. I do not propose returning 
generically to an open-ended balancing exercise—instead, I propose revising 
the definitional exercise to consider more carefully actual uses of government 
property rather than the label affixed to a particular place. 
To the extent that the government permits property to be used by the public 
for activities that are not much different from leafletting or fixed pickets, it 
should not be permitted to close the property to would-be speakers who seek to 
engage in expressive activity protected under the First Amendment. For 
example, if a government building features a courtyard generally open to the 
public, and through which members of the general public may pass, linger, or 
sit, it seems easy enough to permit someone to linger or sit while wearing a t-
shirt with a political message or holding a sign. The disruption caused by 
someone occupying space within the courtyard while drinking a cup of coffee 
or reading a newspaper is essentially, if not exactly, the same. Thus, if a 
government-owned space is otherwise open to the public for one set of activities 
(i.e., drinking coffee or reading a newspaper), the public space also should be 
open for speech activity that is no more disruptive. 
Declaring public property otherwise open to any and all members of the 
public to be a nonpublic forum, and thereby closing it to all forms of expressive 
activity, should not be an available option.166 The federal courts should deny the 
government the power to pick and choose arbitrarily what public property will 
be deemed suitable for speech activity regardless of the actual characteristics, 
and regular day-to-day uses of the property, that the government actually 
permits.167 If the Boston Common is open to those who wish to stroll, exercise, 
or read, then it should be equally open to those who wish to brandish political 
signs.168  
On the other hand, and by way of contrast, a city water treatment plant is 
closed to the public for all purposes and, accordingly, closing it to speech 
activity would be constitutionally unobjectionable. If the government closes 
                                                                                                                     
 166 But cf. Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1157–62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (declaring a large 
plaza in front of the U.S. Supreme Court a “non-public forum” and sustaining, against a First 
Amendment challenge, a federal law banning all First Amendment activity within the plaza). 
 167 But see id. at 1160–62 (holding constitutionally irrelevant the Supreme Court’s 
tolerance of expressive activity on the plaza by lawyers and litigants presenting oral 
arguments to the Supreme Court, in addition to selective enforcement of the ban with respect 
to some protests by non-litigants because the Supreme Court’s approach to doling out access 
to a nonpublic forum need only be “reasonable” and these practices of limited use were not 
self-evidently unreasonable). 
 168 Cf. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46–47 (1897) (upholding a ban on protest 
activity within the Boston Common, even though the property was generally open to 
members of the public). 
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property to the public for all purposes, it is far less likely to be engaged in an 
effort to burden or squelch protected speech activity. When the government 
targets expressive activity for disfavored treatment, however, the federal courts 
should react with a healthy degree of skepticism about the government’s 
motives—and their consistency with the First Amendment.169 If assessing 
motive seems a difficult task for courts,170 simply applying a functional 
approach would avoid difficult exercises in ascertaining the government’s 
purpose in closing public property to speech activity. To state the point more 
directly, the actual and everyday uses of government property, rather than a 
government-affixed label or the historical origins of the particular kind of 
property, should control the First Amendment analysis and outcome. 
Second, federal courts should be more receptive to as applied challenges to 
denials of access to particular property and also to TPM regulations. Even if the 
government may constitutionally close certain categories of public property to 
speech activity, federal courts should nevertheless consider whether, on a 
particular set of facts, the First Amendment requires mandated access for a 
                                                                                                                     
 169 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1061–64 
(2015) (discussing the reasons for applying strict scrutiny to content-based speech 
regulations, noting that “content-based laws are of greater constitutional concern than 
content-neutral laws,” and explaining that “strict scrutiny generally applies to content-based 
laws because the Court is highly suspicious of the proposition that particular messages can 
cause social harm”). Professor Bhagwat argues that even when a valid regulatory interest 
seems to justify a content-based speech regulation, such as Los Angeles County, California’s 
ban on the production of so-called bareback pornography, see id. at 1044–46, 1070–72, 
courts should still be skeptical about the government and its actual motives for seeking to 
suppress speech. See id. at 1064 (arguing that even under intermediate scrutiny review of 
regulations that burden speech “it is important that such scrutiny not be excessively 
deferential to the government,” with particular consideration of whether “the effect of the 
law is to completely eliminate particular content, as opposed to merely limit its creation”). 
 170 Compare U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (declining to assess 
Congress’s real purposes in enacting a statute when the statute’s language bears a clear plain 
meaning because of the difficulties in ascertaining legislative purpose and explaining that 
“we have historically assumed that Congress intended what it enacted”), and Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224–26 (1971) (claiming, contrary to well-established case law, 
that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely 
because of the motivations of the men who voted for it” and arguing that “there is an element 
of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its 
supporters”), with Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
534, 540–41 (1993) (explaining that “facial neutrality is not determinative” of a law’s 
constitutionality and holding that a reviewing court must consider “among other things, the 
historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading 
to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, 
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body”), and 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228–32 (1985) (invalidating a facially race-neutral 
1901 Alabama state constitutional provision that stripped certain felons of their voting rights 
because “zeal for white supremacy ran rampant at the convention” that enacted the provision 
and this improper discriminatory motive rendered the provision inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause). 
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particular group of speakers because of a nexus between the speakers and their 
message and the space at issue.171 
Indeed, one could read Brown v. Louisiana narrowly as permitting the 
particular protest in the local library because a silent protest did not disrupt other 
uses of the library and because the protest targeted the operation of the library 
on a racially segregated basis.172 In other words, a different kind of protest, 
seeking to call attention to a different cause wholly unrelated to the public 
library, might not enjoy First Amendment protection.173 The government’s 
ability to deny access to its property depended on the burden the protest imposed 
on the government’s ability to achieve its objectives and also on the relationship 
of the speech to the venue.174 Even if most forms of protest, and most protesters, 
could not demand to use a public library’s circulation desk area for a political 
protest, the civil rights protesters, engaged in a silent protest of the racially 
segregated operation of that specific public library, stood on different First 
Amendment ground.175 
So too, Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr.’s order in Williams v. Wallace176 
plainly takes into account the nature of the protest and the nexus between the 
forum and the speakers.177 Even if most protesters could not routinely 
commandeer a federal highway for a multi-day, fifty-two mile march, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), in response to a massive 
state-wide effort to suppress the voting rights of African-American citizens, 
possessed a qualitatively different kind of claim that justified greater access to 
public property than the First Amendment would ordinarily require.178 Simply 
put, a different First Amendment analysis—and outcome—should and did 
occur.179 
Judge Johnson considered carefully the petitioning cast of the proposed 
speech activity and the legal responsibility of state and local officials for serious 
constitutional deprivations of basic civil and political rights before issuing an 
                                                                                                                     
 171 See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST 
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009). 
 172 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–43 (1966). 
 173 See id. at 142–43. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965). 
 177 See id. at 106–09. 
 178 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 185–207; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Could a Selma-Like Protest Happen Today? Probably Not, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0308-krotoszynski-selma-march-protest-
doctrine-20150308-story.html [https://perma.cc/9C9L-MUJ7]. 
 179 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 200 (noting that “[t]he proportionality principle 
permits courts to make rational distinctions between proposed uses of public forums for 
speech activities,” explaining that this principle “permits most groups to be relegated to less 
busy corridors but holds out the possibility of using major highways and byways under 
sufficiently compelling circumstances,” and positing that it “permits courts to match venues 
for speech activities with the speaker’s need to speak and the community’s need to hear”). 
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injunctive order permitting the march to proceed as proposed.180 Both the 
identity of the speakers and the relationship of the speech to the particular forum 
factored very heavily into Judge Johnson’s First Amendment analysis.181 
To be sure, considering a speaker’s identity and message does involve 
content-, and perhaps even viewpoint-, based factors. It might seem 
counterintuitive to use a speaker- and content-based screen to determine access 
to public property for speech activity. However, upon more careful reflection, 
these objections are not fatal flaws and do not doom this approach to granting 
targeted access to public property to some speakers but not to others. As I have 
previously argued, “Judge Johnson was correct to recognize enhanced rights of 
access to public property for petitioning speech seeking a redress of grievances 
from the government entity being both petitioned and protested against through 
the same hybrid petitioning activity.”182 
First, and most important, the public forum doctrine already permits the 
government itself to limit access to public property for speech based on the 
would-be speaker and her message.183 The entire concept of a limited-purpose 
public forum entails the government creating a forum accessible by some 
speakers, and for some messages, but not others.184 If the government may limit 
access to forums based on the would-be speakers’ identities and the content of 
their proposed speech, and federal courts are competent to assess the fair 
enforcement of such restrictions, it seems implausible to say that “as applied” 
access to public property cannot work. If courts are capable of superintending 
forum access limits in the context of limited-purpose public forums, then they 
are also capable of considering “as applied” requests for access to nonpublic 
forums or under terms and conditions that violate otherwise constitutionally 
valid TPM regulations. The federal courts have not signaled any problems with 
the creation of limited-purpose public forums; if speaker-based and message-
based limits are capable of judicial implementation in this context, then identical 
considerations in the context of nonpublic forums should be equally feasible. 
Second, First Amendment doctrine is rife with content-based distinctions. 
Pornography and commercial speech receive less robust First Amendment 
                                                                                                                     
 180 Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 106–11. 
 181 See id. at 106–09. 
 182 KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 186; see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Essay, 
Celebrating Selma: The Importance of Context in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 
1411, 1414 (1995) (noting that “[a]lthough the specific circumstances that led Judge Johnson 
to embrace the proportionality principle in 1965 are, thankfully, long gone, the problem of 
ensuring that adequate public space is available to accommodate meaningful social protest 
remains” and suggesting that “[p]roperly understood and carefully limited, the 
proportionality principle can continue to help vindicate democratic values today, just as it 
did . . . in Selma”). 
 183 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 184 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 685 (2010); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
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protection than political speech.185 In order to apply content-based rules of this 
sort, federal judges must ascertain the content of the speech and place it within 
one category or another.186 If federal courts can determine whether speech is 
commercial or political in nature,187 then they are also quite capable of 
determining whether a nexus exists between a particular government-owned 
property and a proposed protest that would take place on that property.188 
Suppose, for example, that military police on an army base shoot and kill an 
unarmed intruder found on base property. Suppose further that allegations of 
racial bias arise within the community as a possible motive for the shooting. Is 
it unthinkable that the base commander might have to make base property 
available for protest activity on these facts, even if the base is not otherwise 
available as a locus for expressive activities? Moreover, would it vest federal 
judges with too much discretion to engage in the kind of analysis that would 
allow a local civil rights organization to stage a march that crosses base property 
                                                                                                                     
 185 Compare Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452–53 (2011) (holding that “speech on 
public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and is 
entitled to special protection”); and Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) 
(opining that “[t]he First Amendment ‘“has its fullest and most urgent application” to speech 
uttered during a campaign for political office’”) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. 
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989)), with Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (noting that multiple precedents “have recognized 
the commonsense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which 
occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of 
speech” (internal quotations omitted) and holding that such speech is “therefore accord[ed] 
a lesser protection . . . than . . . other constitutionally guaranteed expression”), and Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973) (observing that “[t]he First and Fourteenth 
Amendments have never been treated as absolutes” and upholding the constitutional power 
of the state and federal governments to regulate, or even proscribe, obscene speech). 
 186 See, e.g., Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 513–15 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 187 See id. at 517–20, 522. 
 188 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 452–56 (1985) (arguing that the federal courts should seek to protect 
jealously the central “core” of the First Amendment to ensure that it functions effectively as 
a check on the suppression of dissent—and dissenters—in times of national crisis); William 
Van Alstyne, Essay, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on 
Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1640–43, 1646–48 (1996) (arguing that First 
Amendment doctrine can, and should, be nimble enough to draw meaningful distinctions 
between different kinds of speech and to afford political speech related to the process of 
democratic self-government a higher measure of constitutional protection than other kinds 
of speech). Both Professors Blasi and Van Alstyne argue that courts can, and should, use 
content-based metrics to afford some speech differential, favorable treatment because the 
speech relates to the central purposes of the First Amendment. I do not mean to minimize 
the real risks associated with judicial discretion and the protection of unpopular speakers and 
speech. Even so, however, if one posits that existing access to public spaces for expressive 
activity would remain in place, the risks associated with providing enhanced access to public 
property in some instances should be manageable. Moreover, as previously noted, see supra 
notes 184–87 and accompanying text, existing First Amendment doctrine, particularly the 
limited-purpose public forum doctrine, already relies on speaker and content-based 
metrics—but does not seem to cause federal courts serious difficulties with implementation. 
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without requiring the base to be open to any and all would-be protesters? The 
answers to these questions are quite obvious—if we truly view freedom of 
speech as integral to the process of democratic deliberation and government 
accountability, then a federal court faced with a lawsuit seeking an injunction 
that orders the base commander to facilitate a protest march on base property 
should not be resolved with a two-line order that tersely states that a military 
base is not a public forum. 
Finally, one might reasonably ask, in the era of the internet, if silence on the 
street corner, to use Professor Owen Fiss’s wonderful and apt metaphor, really 
matters.189 The short answer: It does. A speaker who wishes to use one modality 
of speech should not be relegated to another; just as the government may not 
order speakers to engage—or refrain from engaging—in speech featuring a 
particular viewpoint or content,190 the First Amendment should also prohibit the 
government from regulating the particular modality of speech that a would-be 
speaker may use to communicate her message.191 
Other reforms in the application of the TPM doctrine could also help to 
create and sustain needed breathing room for the exercise of expressive 
freedoms in public places. The federal courts should apply the content-neutrality 
requirement in a more demanding fashion and not simply accept the facial 
neutrality of a speech regulation as sufficient to establish that the regulation 
passes the first prong of the Ward test.192 In cases like Hill v. Colorado,193 the 
federal courts have been highly credulous of government claims that speech 
regulations were content-neutral, even when the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the adoption of the TPM regulations strongly suggest a government 
purpose to silence a particular speaker or message.194 In other contexts, such as 
ferreting out discrimination based on race195 or religious belief,196 the federal 
courts make a serious effort to ascertain the real or actual purpose of a facially-
neutral enactment.197 This same methodological approach should be deployed 
to assess content-neutrality when applying the Ward test.198 
                                                                                                                     
 189 Fiss, supra note 6, at 1408. 
 190 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972). 
 191 See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143–45 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 
U.S. 147, 162 (1939). 
 192 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1989). 
 193 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000). 
 194 See id. at 719–20, 723. The Hill majority went so far as to claim that a ban on protest 
outside abortion clinics was not even a regulation of “speech” but merely of “conduct.” Id. 
at 719 (“Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur.”). This 
approach has the effect of rendering any and all TPM regulations content neutral because 
they too only seek to regulate “the places where some speech may occur.” Id. 
 195 Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228–32 (1985). 
 196 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534, 540–
41 (1993). 
 197 See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228–32. 
 198 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 28–30. 
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Second, the federal courts should press the government to provide an actual 
reason for the creation and enforcement of TPM regulations—rather than simply 
accept vague assertions that particular TPM regulations advance an important 
government interest. In this regard, federal judges should not blithely credit 
highly generalized invocations of security concerns as a basis for banishing 
dissent from public spaces.199 At present, however, courts are inclined to be 
extremely deferential to government invocations of security and public safety 
rationales for speech bans on public property and to require very little in the way 
of “narrow tailoring” to achieve the government’s important or substantial 
purpose.200 
Third, and finally, the ample alternative channels of communication prong 
of the Ward test should take into account whether the available alternative 
means of communication are likely to permit the would-be speaker to reach the 
same audience no less reliably, effectively, and efficiently than through a public 
protest. For example, a protest of a NATO meeting proximate to the meeting 
venue for a group of NATO officials is far more likely to be heard and seen by 
NATO officials than a random blog post or Tweet.201 At present, however, this 
aspect of the Ward test does not take into account the efficacy of the alternative 
means of communication in reaching the speaker’s preferred audience.202 As 
the saying goes, if a tree falls in the forest, and no one sees it, the event might 
as well not have happened. What is true of trees falling in forests holds doubly 
true of public protest aimed at engaging the general citizenry to support or 
oppose particular government policies and actions.203 
These reforms in the application of the Ward test for TPM regulations would 
substantially improve the application of existing doctrine and would materially 
shift the burden to the government to justify refusals to make public property 
that admittedly comprises a public forum available for speech activity. 
However, and as I have argued previously,204 a more general and systematic 
                                                                                                                     
 199 See id. at 31–50 (discussing the many cases in which the lower federal courts have 
reflexively credited the government’s claim that draconian limits on public protest were 
necessary for reasons of public safety and security); see also Citizens for Peace in Space v. 
City of Colo. Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1217–21 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 200 Citizens for Peace in Space, 477 F.3d at 1221 (“While an extremely important 
government interest does not dictate the result in time, place, and manner cases, the 
significance of the government interest bears an inverse relationship to the rigor of the 
narrowly tailored analysis.”). 
 201 See id. at 1217–20. 
 202 See Bl(a)ck Tea Soc’y v. City of Bos., 378 F.3d 8, 13–14 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 203 See KROTOSZYNSKI, supra note 78, at 34 (“The key doctrinal point here is that the 
Free Speech and Free Assembly Clauses apparently do not afford any protection to a would-
be speaker’s interest in speaking to a particular audience in real time, even if he seeks to do 
so by utilizing a classic traditional public forum, such as a street, side-walk, or park.”); see 
also Enrique Armijo, The “Ample Alternative Channels” Flaw in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1657, 1682 (2016). 
 204 See supra notes 166–75 and accompanying text. 
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reorientation of First Amendment theory and doctrine is needed in this important 
area of law. 
Simply put, the Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have been far too solicitous 
of the government’s unsubstantiated claims of managerial necessity—and have 
credited weak, to the point of spurious, claims that speech bans or TPM 
regulations are necessary in order for the government to function efficiently. 
Resetting the balance in favor of greater access to public property for speech 
activity would not seriously endanger or prevent the government from achieving 
its legitimate purposes. Nor would it mean that public parks, streets, and 
sidewalks would devolve into total chaos as protesters commandeered such 
spaces at will. Instead, adopting such theoretical and doctrinal innovations 
would help to advance and facilitate broad-based participation in the process of 
democratic self-government by ordinary people who lack the ability to use their 
own private property to access the marketplace of ideas. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The right of ordinary citizens to use public property for First Amendment 
activities has declined over time from the 1980s to the present.205 During the 
Warren and Burger Court eras, the federal courts were much more willing to 
require the government to facilitate private speech by ordering access to 
government-owned property for First Amendment activities.206 The First 
Amendment gave rise to a positive right of access—a free speech easement—to 
public property.207 Beginning in the early 1980s, and accelerating into the 
1990s, the Supreme Court retreated from this commitment in favor of granting 
the government considerably broader discretion to manage public property as it 
thinks best.208 
To be sure, the Supreme Court is unlikely to jettison the public forum 
doctrine at this point in time. Simply put, too much water has flowed under the 
doctrinal bridge. The perfect, however, should not be the enemy of the merely 
good—or in this instance, the better. It would be possible to modify the 
operation of the public forum doctrine to shift the balance away from unfettered 
government discretion to grant or withhold access to public property toward a 
model in which the government has to shoulder a higher burden of justification 
for refusing to make public property available for protest activity. Defining 
“public forums” in functional terms, rather than historical terms, would 
                                                                                                                     
 205 See Zick, Expressive Topography, supra note 14, at 447. 
 206 See, e.g., Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 107–09 (M.D. Ala. 1965). 
 207 Zick, Expressive Topography, supra note 14, at 445.  
 208 See Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1150, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (rejecting a First 
Amendment challenge to a federal statute that bans protest on the large, elevated marble 
plaza located in front of the United States Supreme Court because of “the government’s long-
recognized interests in preserving decorum in the area of a courthouse and in assuring the 
appearance (and actuality) of a judiciary uninfluenced by public opinion and pressure”). 
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constitute a good first start.209 In addition, the federal courts should signal a 
greater willingness to consider “as applied” challenges both to denials of access 
to nonpublic forums and also to otherwise-valid TPM regulations of public 
forums. 
If freedom of speech is a necessary condition for the maintenance of 
democratic self-government, then government, at all levels, should be required 
to incur costs and inconveniences in order to facilitate democratic deliberation 
among the citizenry. Just as the government cannot limit voting rights to those 
with a minimum amount of property, the government should not have the 
discretion to leave access to the political marketplace of ideas entirely to private 
market ordering. I do not suggest that the government should be able to limit, or 
level down, the ability of those with property to use their property for speech 
activity. But, citizens who wish to protest government policies, like Cindy 
Sheehan,210 should not be forced to purchase real property in order to do so 
effectively. 
It is possible to imagine a limited, affirmative right to use government 
property for speech and to adopt a doctrinal framework that fully honors this 
baseline commitment to safeguarding democratic deliberation. The Warren and 
Burger Courts’ open-ended balancing approach might have vested too much 
discretion with trial courts and undoubtedly produced inconsistent results in 
cases presenting similar facts. Even so, it would be possible to move toward an 
Aristotelean “virtuous mean”211 between the extremes of treating the 
government as if it were just another private property owner and permitting 
citizens to appropriate government property for First Amendment activities 
whenever and wherever they choose. 
In sum, under the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, the balance has shifted too 
far in favor of government discretion to deny would-be speakers access to public 
property for protest. A course correction that places a higher burden of 
justification on the government for resisting free speech easements on public 
property would better serve our core commitment to freedom of expression as 
an essential condition for democratic self-government to flourish. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 209 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 693–96, 701–
03 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting a categorical, historical approach to analyzing 
whether government property constitutes a public forum and proposing instead an open-
ended, contextual, functional approach that would consider the actual day-to-day uses of 
particular property). 
 210 See supra note 2. 
 211 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 42–53, ¶¶ 1106a5–1109b (Terence Irwin 
trans., 1985); see also Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion 
in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 286–88 (1996) (discussing the Aristotelian notion 
of the virtuous mean that lies between problematic extreme forms of behavior that reflect 
either a surfeit or a shortage of a particular character trait). 

